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Abstract In this paper, we suggest a new code-based public key encryption
scheme, called McNie. McNie is a hybrid version of the McEliece and Nieder-
reiter cryptosystems and its security is reduced to the hard problem of syn-
drome decoding. The public key involves a random generator matrix which is
also used to mask the code used in the secret key. This makes the system safer
against known structural attacks. In particular, we apply rank-metric codes
to McNie.
Keywords McEliece cryptosystem · McNie · Niederreiter cryptosystem
1 Introduction
Code-based cryptography was introduced in 1978 by McEliece using binary
Goppa codes, providing efficient encryption and decryption algorithms, and
reasonably good security level [32]. The security of the McEliece cryptosystem
relies on the hardness of decoding a random linear code in some metric. Since
the key size in the original proposal by McEliece is significantly larger than
those of RSA and ECC, it has been considered inefficient. To overcome this
problem, there has been tremendous progress in code-based cryptography us-
ing various codes replacing Goppa codes [3,6,8,27,31,34,36,37,40]. However
most of the proposed cryptosystems are broken by structural attacks using the
algebraic structures of the codes used [2,9,10,14,29,33,39,41,42].
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In 1991, Gabidulin, Paramonov and Tretjakov (GPT) [18] proposed a vari-
ant of McEliece based on Gabidulin codes, which are a family of the so-called
rank-metric codes with an efficient algebraic polynomial time decoding algo-
rithm. The GPT cryptosystem, unfortunately, was broken by Overbeck [38]
using the invariant property of a vector space under Frobenius automorphism.
Afterwards a new family of rank-metric codes was introduced by Gaborit, Ru-
atta, Schrek and Zemor [20], namely Low Rank Parity Check (LRPC) codes.
So far, the double-circulant LRPC (DC-LRPC) code based cryptosystem is
known to be secure against the existing attacks.
We propose a new code-based public key cryptosystem, which we call Mc-
Nie, as a candidate for the NIST Post-quantum Cryptography Standardization
[43]. McNie is a hybrid version of the McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems.
Unlike the McEliece cryptosystem, we employ a random code in the encryp-
tion so that McNie is secure against structural and information set decoding
attacks. We proved that it is not more difficult to break McEliece than McNie.
After the submission, we have received two attacks. First, Gaborit [44]
proposed a message recovery attack to lower the security level of the original
submitted parameters. Then, Lau and Tan [30] proposed a key-recovery at-
tack. In this paper, we describe McNie and show how to avoid these attacks.
Furthermore, the McNie document submitted to NIST did not describe the
security reduction. So we show that the security of McNie is based on the
(Rank) Syndrome Decoding Problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we in-
troduce basic notions and terminologies used throughout the paper and a
modified decoding algorithm for LRPC codes reducing the complexity in [20].
In Section 3, we present the general key generation, encryption and decryp-
tion algorithms for McNie. We then show how key sizes can be reduced using
3-quasi or 4-quasi cyclic LRPC codes. In Section 4, we analyze the security of
the proposed cryptosystem against known attacks and examine the parameter
restrictions. In Section 5, we suggest parameters for 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-
bit security levels, and provide the corresponding key sizes, comparing with
other code-based public key sizes.
This work was partially presented at the First NIST Post-quantum Cryp-
tography Conference in April 2018, but it was never published as a conference
or journal paper.
2 Background
2.1 Rank codes
We begin by defining the rank metric codes or simply, rank codes. Essentially,
rank codes are linear codes equipped with the rank metric, instead of the usual
Hamming metric. There are two representations of rank codes, as we will see
later, which are actually related. One of them was first introduced by Delsarte
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in the matrix representation originally as a bilinear form [11]. The other, the
vector representation, was introduced by Gabidulin in his seminal paper [16].
Definition 1 Rank codes inmatrix representation are subsets of the normed
space {Fm×nq , Rk} of m× n matrices over a finite field Fq, where the norm of
a matrix M ∈ Fm×nq is defined to be its algebraic rank Rk(M) over Fq. The
rank distance dR(M1,M2) between two matrices M1 and M2 is the rank of
their difference, i.e., dR(M1,M2) = Rk(M1 −M2). The rank distance of a
matrix rank code M⊂ Fm×nq is defined as the minimal pairwise distance:
d(M) = d = min(Rk(Mi −Mj) : Mi,Mj ∈ M, i 6= j).
Notice that for a given ordered basis β = {β1, β2, . . . , βm} of Fqm over Fq,
every vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ F
n
qm corresponds to a matrix v¯ whose i
th
column consists of the coefficients when vi is written in terms of the basis
β. Moreover, Rk(v) = Rk(v¯) and this is independent of the chosen basis.
Therefore, every rank code C in vector representation can be expressed as a
rank code in matrix representation, with respect to the basis β. Throughout the
rest of this paper, all rank codes being considered are in vector representation.
Another difference between rank codes and codes in the Hamming metric
is the definition of the support of a codeword.
Definition 2 Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ F
n
qm be a vector of rank r. We denote
by E the Fq-sub vector space of Fqm generated by the entries of x, i.e., E =
〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉. The vector space E is called the support of x.
Many well-known codes in the Hamming metric have rank metric ana-
logues. Of particular interest in many cryptographic applications are the so-
called LRPC codes, which can be considered as the analogue of LDPC codes
in the rank metric.
Definition 3 A Low Rank Parity Check (LRPC) code of rank d, length n
and dimension k over Fqm is a code that has for its parity check matrix an
(n−k)×n matrix H = (hij) such that the sub-vector space of Fqm generated by
its coefficients hij has dimension at most d. We call this dimension the weight
of H. Letting F be the sub-vector space of Fqm generated by the coefficients
hij of H, we denote one of its bases by {F1, F2, . . . , Fd}.
Simply put, the entries of the parity check matrix H belong to a subfield F of
small dimension and can be expressed as hij =
∑d
l=1 hijlFl, for some hijl ∈ Fq
and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n− k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
A special type of LRPC code is the following:
Definition 4 An LRPC code such that its parity check matrix H is a quasi-
cyclic matrix of low weight d is called a quasi-cyclic LRPC (QC-LRPC) code.
If H is double-circulant, i.e., the concatenation of two cyclic matrices, then
the code is called a double-circulant LRPC (DC-LRPC) code.
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2.2 Rank code based cryptography
In 1978, McEliece proposed a public key cryptosystem using a family of error-
correcting codes with efficient decoding algorithm [32]. In the original con-
struction, a binary t-error-correcting Goppa code with generator matrix G is
generated together with an invertible matrix S, called the scrambler matrix,
and a permutation matrix P . The triple (G,S, P ) forms the private key. The
matrices S and P are used to hide the algebraic structure of G so the public
key is Gpub = SGP . The messagem is then encrypted as c =mGpub+e where
e is a random vector of weight at most t. In order to decrypt the received mes-
sage c, note that cP−1 =mSG+ eP−1. Since eP−1 is still of weight less than
t, we can apply the decoding algorithm to obtain mS and finally multiplying
by S−1 to obtain m.
One drawback of the McEliece cryptosystem is the large key size. In re-
cent years, rank codes have also been used in order to reduce key sizes. For
instance, it is proposed in [20] that LRPC codes are very fitting to use in a
McEliece-type rank code based cryptosystem. This is so because LRPC code
has an efficient decoding algorithm, as shown in the next section. Moreover,
in the LRPC cryptosystem, the private key is the low rank parity check ma-
trix H and the public key is the generator matrix G, hence eliminating the
need for a scrambler matrix and a permutation matrix. This is the first rank
metric based cryptosystem with poor algebraic structure, and is still consid-
ered secure. Furthermore, the double circulant variant provides very small key
sizes.
Like many cryptographic systems, the McEliece cryptosystem is based on
the hardness of a certain problem known as the syndrome decoding problem.
This problem is generalized in the case of rank metric as follows:
Rank Syndrome Decoding (RSD) Problem
Let H be a (n− k)×n matrix over Fqm with k ≤ n, s ∈ F
k
qm and r an integer.
Find x such that Rk(x) = r and Hxt = s.
The RSD problem is proven to be probabilistically NP-hard [24].
2.3 Decoding LRPC codes
The decoding algorithm for LRPC codes was introduced in [20]. The idea of
the decoding algorithm is to recover the support E of the error from the space
S generated by the entries of the syndrome and the known small basis F of
H . If the error space E is obtained, it is easy to recover the exact coordinates
of the error vector e by solving a linear system.
As in the definition of LRPC code, let H = (hij) ⊆ F
n
qm such that each
hij belongs to a subspace F with basis {F1, F2, . . . , Fd} and write hij =∑d
v=1 hijvFv. Suppose that the received word is y = mG + e ∈ F
n
qm where
e = (e1, . . . , en) is the error vector of rank r lying in the subspace E with
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basis {E1, E2, . . . , Er}. Rewrite the entries of e = (e1, e2, . . . , en) in terms of
the basis {E1, E2, . . . , Er}, i.e.,
ej =
r∑
u=1
ejuEu.
Let e′ = (e11, e12, . . . , enr). Denote by 〈F .E〉 the product space generated by
{F1E1, F1E2, . . . , FdEr} and suppose the dimension of 〈F .E〉 is rd.
We will transform the syndrome equation Het = s as an equation over the
base field Fq. First, rewrite the entries of s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn−k) in terms of the
basis {F1E1, F1E2, . . . , FdEr} for F .E, i.e.,
si =
d∑
v=1
r∑
u=1
sivuFvEu.
So we have s′ = (s111, s112, . . . , s(n−k)dr)
t, the representation of s with entries
in Fq. So the syndrome equation is equivalent to
n∑
j=1
d∑
v=1
r∑
u=1
hijvejuFvEu =
r∑
u=1
d∑
v=1
sivuFvEu
written over Fq. Equating coefficients of FvEu (1 ≤ v ≤ d, 1 ≤ u ≤ r) we have∑r
j=1 hijveju = sivu.
This means that there exists a (n−k)rd×nr matrix ArH such that A
r
He
′t =
s′. Note that the entries of ArH are the hijv’s and some 0’s. In fact, if A
r
H =
(aij), then
au+(v−1)r+(i−1)rd, u+(j−1)r = hijv
for 1 ≤ v ≤ d, 1 ≤ u ≤ r, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n and 0’s elsewhere. The
matrix will appear as follows:
ArH =


h111 h121 h1n1
. . .
. . . · · ·
. . .
h111 h121 h1n1
h112 h122 h1n2
. . .
. . . · · ·
. . .
h112 h122 h1n2
...
... · · ·
...
h(n−k)1d h(n−k)2d h(n−k)nd
. . .
. . . · · ·
. . .
h(n−k)1d h(n−k)2d h(n−k)nd


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Definition 5 Let AH be an nr × nr invertible submatrix of A
r
H . The matrix
DH = A
−1
H is called a decoding matrix of H .
The decoding algorithm can be summarized in the following steps:
1. Compute the syndrome vectorHyt = s = (s1, . . . , sn−k) and the syndrome
space S =< s1, . . . , sn−k >.
2. Define Si = F
−1
i S, the subspace where all generators of S are multiplied
by F−1i . Compute the support of the error E = S1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Sd, and
compute a basis {E1, E2, . . . , Er} of E.
3. Solve the system Het = s, where the equations Het and the syndrome
coordinates si are written as elements of the product space P =< F .E >
in the basis {F1E1, . . . , F1Er , . . . , FdE1, . . . , FdEr}. The system has nr
unknowns (the eij ) in Fq and (n−k)rd equations from the syndrome. The
decoding matrix DH permits to recover directly the nr values eij from nr
positions of the si written in product basis by a simple multiplication.
4. Recover m from the system mG = y− e.
The following theorem from [20] gives the error-correction failure proba-
bility and decoding complexity of the above algorithm.
Theorem 1 Let H be a (n−k)×n dual matrix of an LRPC code with low rank
d ≥ 2 over Fqm . Then the decoding algorithm given above decodes a random
error e of low rank r such that rd ≤ n−k, with failure probability q−(n−k+1−rd)
and complexity r2(4d2m+ n2).
2.4 Reducing the decoding complexity by a factor of the number r of errors
The decoding algorithm proposed by Gaborit et al. [20] is proven fast and
efficient, performing in polynomial time. However the matrix ArH used in the
decoding has many pointless zeros and this leads to the increment of decoding
complexity.
Here we introduce a modified decoding algorithm, reducing the complexity
from r2(4d2m + n2) to r(4d2m + n2) by a factor of r. The decoding com-
plexity can be lowered by modifying the matrix ArH to K
r
H = (kij), where
ki+(n−k)(v−1),j = hijv for 1 ≤ v ≤ d, 1 ≤ u ≤ r, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− k, and 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Note that KrH is now then an (n− k)d× n matrix.
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KrH =


h111 h121 · · · h1n1
h211 h221 · · · h2n1
...
...
...
h(n−k)11 h(n−k)21 · · · h(n−k)n1
h112 h122 · · · h1n2
h212 h222 · · · h2n2
...
...
...
h(n−k)12 h(n−k)22 · · · h(n−k)n2
..
.
..
.
..
.
h11d h12d · · · h1nd
h21d h22d · · · h2nd
...
...
...
h(n−k)1d h(n−k)2d · · · h(n−k)nd


Definition 6 Let KH be an n × n invertible submatrix of K
r
H . The matrix
D′H = K
−1
H is called a K-decoding matrix of H .
We can write the error vector e and the syndrome s as follows:
e =


e11 e12 · · · e1r
e21 e22 · · · e2r
...
...
...
en1 en2 · · · enr

 , s =


s111 s112 · · · s11r
s211 s212 · · · s21r
.
..
.
..
.
..
s(n−k)11 s(n−k)12 · · · s(n−k)1r
s121 s122 · · · s12r
s221 s222 · · · s22r
...
...
...
s(n−k)21 s(n−k)22 · · · s(n−k)2r
...
...
...
s1d1 s1d2 · · · s1dr
s2d1 s2d2 · · · s2dr
...
...
...
s(n−k)d1 s(n−k)d2 · · · s(n−k)dr


3 The McNie Public-key Encryption
3.1 Design of the scheme
The following describes the general key generation, encryption and decryption
algorithms of the proposed McNie public key encryption scheme. Notice that
in this general scheme, a random code is used as part of the public key, which
is not related to the code used in the secret key.
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Key generation
Generate a parity check matrix H ∈ F
(n−k)×n
qm of an r-error-correcting
code with an efficient decoding algorithm ΦH , an invertible matrix S ∈
F
(n−k)×(n−k)
qm and an n× n isometry P .
Generate a generator matrix G′ of a random [n, l] code over Fqm , where
l > n− k and compute F = G′P−1HTS.
– Private key: (S,H, P )
– Public key: (G′, F )
Encryption
To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ Flqm , generate a random vector e ∈ F
n
qm of
weight at most r. Compute c1 =mG
′ + e and c2 =mF .
– Ciphertext: (c1, c2)
Decryption
To decrypt a received vector y = (c1, c2), compute s
′ = c1P
−1HT −
c2S
−1 = eP−1HT , then eP−1 = ΦH(s
′). Apply P to obtain e and recover
m from c1 − e =mG
′ using linear algebra.
Note that in the decryption step, we use the decryption algorithm for H
even though c1 is encrypted using G
′ and so the weight of the error vector e
depends onH and not on the public keyG′. Since G′ is random and not related
toH in any way, the error vector e can have weight beyond the error-correction
capability of the code generated by G′. In other words, if the error-correction
capability of the code generated by G′ is less that r, decryption is still possible
but an attacker would face a more difficult task of decoding the message using
G′. This provides an added security compared to the usual McEliece setting.
Remark 1 We note that McNie is a general scheme of McEliece. Let G be
a generator matrix of the code with an (n − k) × n parity check matrix H .
Suppose that the public matrix is G′ = S′GP , where S is an invertible matrix
and P is a permutation matrix. Then F = (S′GP )P−1HTS = 0 ∈ F
k×(n−k)
qm
since GHT = 0 so c2 = 0 ∈ F
n−k
qm and c1 = mG
′ + e = mS′GP + e is the
ciphertext for the McEliece cryptosystem.
Remark 2 Notice that the dimension l of a public key G′ should be greater
than the dimension n−k of the parity check matrix H . Otherwise, the attacker
may recover the message vector from the ciphertext c2 = mF , where m =
(m1,m2, . . . ,ml) and F an l × (n − k) matrix. That is, if l ≤ rank(F ), the
linear system with l unknowns will give us the unique solution, which is the
message m. When rank(F ) < l, there are qm(l−rank(F )) possible solutions for
m.
Remark 3 Suppose F = G′P−1HTS = G′H0 for some n× (n− k) matrix H0
over Fqm , then the number of possible choices for H0 is q
m(n−l)(n−k).
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McNie is designed to use the parity check matrixH of any r-error correcting
code belonging to a family of codes with known efficient decoding algorithm. In
the following sections, we use rank metric codes, particularly the quasi-cyclic
variants of LRPC codes in order to reduce key sizes.
3.2 Generating keys using 3-quasi-cyclic LRPC codes
Lau and Chan [30] gave a structural attack for these codes when the isometric
matrix P is the identity matrix. We can avoid this by choosing a non-identity
matrix P which is given in detail as follows.
The size of public key (G′, F ) can be reduced by using quasi-cyclic codes.
Let G′ be an [n, 2n3 ] be a generator matrix for a random 3-quasi-cyclic code
over Fqm and H be a parity check matrix for an [n,
n
3 ] 3-quasi-cyclic LRPC
code over Fqm . Then G
′ and H will be in the following form:
G′ =
[
In
3
0 G1
0 In
3
G2
]
, H =
[
H1 H2 H3
]
where Gi and Hj are circulant square matrices of size
n
3 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 and
1 ≤ j ≤ 3.
Next, randomly generate an n3 ×
n
3 nonsingular block cyclic matrix S over
Fqm , and a nonsingular matrix P over the base field Fq such that P
−1 =
P1 P2 P3P4 P5 P6
P7 P8 P9

 where each Pi is a cyclic matrix. Then F = G′P−1HTS is
F =
[
In
3
0 G1
0 In
3
G2
]P1 P2 P3P4 P5 P6
P7 P8 P9



H
T
1
HT2
HT3

S
=
[
(P1 +G1P7)H
T
1 + (P2 +G1P8)H
T
2 + (P3 +G1P9)H
T
3
(P4 +G2P7)H
T
1 + (P5 +G2P8)H
T
2 + (P6 +G2P9)H
T
3
]
S,
an 2n3 ×
n
3 cyclic matrix over Fqm .
Note that since S is also block cyclic, it allows a square matrix F ′ of size
n
3 to be cyclic in the following row echelon form of F :
F =
[
In
3
F ′
]
.
Reduced key size
Since we can recover the rest of the rows of circulant matrices from the first
row, we store only 2nm3 Log(q) bits for G
′ and nm3 Log(q) bits for F (instead of
storing all the bits of the whole matrices) and so the total public key size is
nmLog(q). Here, Log denotes the logarithm base 2.
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3.3 Generating keys using 4-quasi-cyclic LRPC codes
Lau and Chan [30] gave a structural attack for these codes when the isometric
matrix P is the identity matrix. We can avoid this by choosing a non-identity
matrix P which is given in detail as follows.
In order to reduce key sizes in our system, we use circulant matrices and
construct quasi-cyclic codes in the public and private keys.
Suppose j = n/4. Let C be an [n, 2j] LRPC code over Fqm with rank d
and parity check matrix H in the following form:
H =
[
H1 H2 H3 H4
H5 H6 H7 H8
]
(1)
where Hi, are circulant matrices of size j × j for i = 1, 2, . . . , 8. Choose the
nonsingular 2j × 2j scrambler matrix S to be block-circulant matrix, as well.
Finally, take P =


P1 P2 P3 P4
P5 P6 P7 P8
P9 P10 P11 P12
P13 P14 P15 P16

 to be an invertible matrix over the base
field Fq where each Pi is a j × j circulant matrix. The private key is (H,S).
Let G′ take the following form:
G′ =

 Ij 0j 0j G10j Ij 0j G2
0j 0j Ij G3

 (2)
where Ij is the j × j identity matrix, 0j is the zero matrix of size j × j and
G1, G2, G3 are circulant matrices of size j × j. Then similar to the 3-quasi-
cyclic case previously discussed, F is a block circulant matrix and if it is of full
column rank, then we can further reduce the key size by choosing a suitable
S such that F ultimately has the column echelon form
F =

 Ij 0j0j Ij
F ′ F ′′

 (3)
where the j × j matrices F ′ and F ′′ are also circulant.
Reduced key size
Similarly, by considering only the first columns of each circulant matrix, we
have the reduced public key size of 54nmLog(q) bits where Log is the logarithm
base 2.
4 Security Arguments
One advantage of using rank metric over the Hamming metric is the rapid
increase in the complexity of practical attacks on finding low weight codewords
as the parameters increase. This is due to the fact that finding codewords of
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certain weight r in rank metric means finding subspaces of Fqm of dimension
r. The number of such subspaces is given by the Gaussian binomial coefficient[
m
r
]
q
≈ q(m−r)r. On the other hand, the number of codewords with Hamming
weight r is
(
n
r
)
which is upper bounded by 2n.
4.1 Security reduction
The security of the McNie cryptosystem is reduced to the RSD problem.
Proof
– Attacking c1 =mG
′+e is an instance of the RSD problem with parameters
(n, l, r).
– Attacking c2 =mF is an instance of the RSD with parameters (l, l− (n−
k), r).
– Attacking c = (c1, c2) = m(G|F ) + (e|0) is an instance of RSD with
parameters (2n− k, l, r).
4.2 Practical security
In this section we analyze the security of the proposed cryptosystem against
known attacks.
4.2.1 Direct Attacks on the message
An adversary can try to recover the message by directly attacking the cipher-
text. The following are the best known attacks for solving the RSD problem
with parameters (n, k, r).
1. Combinatorial attacks These types of attacks consider the support of a
codeword and apply the Information Set Decoding [4] in rank metric sense.
The best known strategy in [1] has complexity (n− k)3m3qr
(k+1)m
n
−m.
2. Algebraic attacks This attack is natural for rank metric case and is
most useful when qm increases. There are several types of algebraic equa-
tions settings to try to solve a multivariate system with Gro¨bner ba-
sis. The best known attack in [21] has complexity upper bounded by
r3k3qr⌈
(r+1)(k+1)−(n+1)
r
⌉.
4.2.2 Gaborit’s attack [44]
Notice that if m = (m1,m2, . . . ,ml) and F is of full rank, then we obtain
n − k linear equations of the mi’s from c2 = mF . Hence, all the coordinates
mi’s can be expressed in terms of some fixed l − (n− k) coordinates. We can
then rewrite c1 as c1 =m
′G′′+ e where G′′ is of dimension l− (n− k). So an
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attacker can use the attacks above on a code of dimension l− (n− k) instead
of a code of dimension l.
This attack can be avoided by slightly modifying the encryption step. An
error e2 is added on c2, i.e., c2 =mF +e2 so that no linear relations between
the coordinates mi’s can be obtained. Further discussion on this modification
can be found on [19].
4.2.3 Structural attacks
There is a structural attack proposed by Lau, et al. in [30] that takes advantage
of the block cyclic structure of the matrices used and the assumption that P
is the identity matrix. In this case, the equation FS = G′HT is linear and S
and H can be solved directly. This attack can be avoided simply by using a
non-identity matrix P .
An attacker may also attack the public matrix F to obtain H . Since G′
is known, an attacker can proceed with decomposing F to F = G′H0. This
would yield q(n−l)(n−k) possible solutions H0. However, if H is a low-rank
parity check matrix, H0 = H
TS may not be a low rank so LRPC decoding
can not be used in general.
4.2.4 Attack on the LRPC cryptosystem [22]
This structural attack tries to attack directly the LRPC structure of the public
key to recover the secret key. The fact that all the elements of the LRPC
matrix H belong to the same subspace F of rank d can be used. For the
dual code D generated by H , all the coordinates of x ∈ D belong to F . By
rewriting x =
∑n−k
i=1 aiHi for ai ∈ Fq where the n− k rows of H are denoted
by Hi(1 ≤ i ≤ n − k) and determining d ai’s in Fq, it allows x to have
⌊(n − k)/d⌋ coordinates of zeros since H has the weight of d. With a good
probability, this vector x lies in the dual code D and we may assume the
first ⌊(n− k)/d⌋ coordinates of x are all zeros without loss of generality. Now
the structural attack can be done to LRPC code by choosing the subcode D′
of D by puncturing the first ⌊(n − k)/d⌋ columns of D. Then D′ will be an
[n−⌊(n− k)/d⌋, n− k− ⌊(n− k)/d⌋] code which contains a codeword of rank
d.
This attack uses the structure of the LRPC matrix and the attacker only
needs to find a subcode which contains at least one codeword of rank d. How-
ever the computational cost of this attack is exponential. There is a result
which slightly reduced its cost using the cyclicity to decrease the number of
columns of the attacked matrix. The attacker can remove columns correspond-
ing to zeros of a small weight vector of the secret key and try to recover it.
This attack is equivalent to the attack for NTRU [26] and for MDPC codes
[34].
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4.2.5 Attack on the cyclic structure [25]
McEliece cryptosystem based on quasi-cyclic or quasi-monoidic codes can be
attacked by reducing the size of the code by adding coordinates which belong
to the same orbit of the automorphism group, called the “folding” process [12,
13]. This process is applied to quasi-cyclic, quasi-dyadic, alternant or Goppa
codes to attack the cryptosystem for key recovery. It was shown that the
same method can be used for quasi-cyclic LRPC codes to obtain a code of
much smaller size but have in its dual some low weight codewords. Then the
decoding algorithm in [21] can be applied to find low weight codewords in more
efficient way than that of the original code. Hauteville and Tillich show their
attacks are efficient for double circulant LRPC based system, especially when
the polynomial in which the folding process is generalized can be factored.
Using this method, one of the proposed parameters in [20] got broken by an
attack of complexity 243.6. However this attack can be avoided by choosing
the polynomial carefully. The proposed parameters in this paper are secure
against these attacks.
4.2.6 Other attacks
In our proposed cryptosystem, since the public code generated by G′ is not
related to the secret code generated by H , attacking G′ does not in any way
expose the private code. Thus, finding a low weight codeword in the dual of G′
is useless since G′ is randomly chosen, and in general, not LRPC. This allows
us to have freedom on choosing our low rank d as it does not affect the public
keys. Since LRPC decoding can be used as long as rd ≤ n− k, we can choose
d small enough and r high enough for increased security.
For the message attack, in general, if G′ has a smaller error-correction
capability compared to H , then decoding using G will fail. Also, since G′ is
randomly generated, this is the rank-RSD problem. In this proposal, we can
select good parameters in order to increase the decoding failure probability of
using the public matrix G′ while keeping a low decoding failure probability for
the private matrix H . An attacker may also use c2 to recover m by solving a
system. As mentioned in Remark 2, the proposed cryptosystem is designed to
have q(l−rank(F )) possible solutions. Although c2 =mF resembles the cipher-
text from the Niederreiter cryptosystem, notice that there is no restriction on
the weight of the message m so attacking the Niederreiter cryptosystem does
not completely compromise our system.
4.3 Semantic security
In McNie, the generator matrix G′ and the scrambler matrix S are randomly
generated. Using S, the structure of the parity check matrix H of an LRPC
code is masked to have F . The approach introduced in [34] for the MDPC
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cryptosystem on the indistinguishability to random codes and the CCA-2 con-
version in [28] can be adapted in McNie as follows:
Notations
Prep(m) : Preprocessing to a message m, such as data-compression, data-padding
and so on. Its inverse is represented as Prep−1().
Hash(x) : One-way hash function of an arbitrary length binary string x to a
fixed length binary string.
Conv(z¯) : Bijective function which converts a vector z¯ over Fqm into the corres-
ponding error vector z of length n with a constant rank weight r.
Its inverse is represented as Conv−1().
Gen(x) : Generator of a cryptographically secure pseudo random sequences of
arbitrary length from a fixed length seed x.
Msbx1(x2) : The left x1 bits of x2.
Lsbx1(x2) : The right x1 bits of x2.
Const : Predetermined constant used in public.
Rand : Random source which generates a truly random (or computationally
indistinguishable pseudorandom) sequence.
EMcNie(x, z) : Encryption of x using the McNie PKC with an error vector z.
DMcNie(x) : Decryption of x using the McNie PKC.
Encryption of m: Decryption of c:
r := Rand y5 := Msbn−l(c)
m¯ := Prep(m) z := Lsb2n(c)
y1 := Gen(r)⊕ (m¯||Const) c1 := Msbn(z)
y2 := r⊕Hash(y1) c2 := Lsbn(z)
(y5||y4||y3) := (y2||y1) y3 := DMcNie(c1||c2)
e := Conv(y4) e := y3G′ ⊕ c1
(c1||c2) := EMcNie(y3, e) y4 :=Conv−1(e)
c := (y5||c1||c2) (y2||y1) := (y5||y4||y3)
return c r := y2 ⊕Hash(y1)
m¯||Const′ := Gen(r)⊕ y1
If Const′ = Const
return Prep−1(m¯)
Otherwise reject c
Table 1 McNie conversion
The lengths of y3, y4, and y5 are as follows.
– Len(y3) = ⌊
lm
8 ⌋ bytes.
– Len(y4) = ⌊
(
r(r−1)
2 + r(m+ n− 2r)
)
/8⌋ bytes.
– Len(y5) = Len(m¯) + Len(Const) + Len(r)− Len(y4)− Len(y3) bytes.
– If Len(m¯) + Len(Const) + Len(r) = Len(y4) + Len(y3), remove y5.
Referring to [20], it is possible to use the approach in [15] which permits
that no information is given in the case of decryption failure. This approach
is used in NTRU and the MDPC code based cryptosystem as well.
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5 Suggested Parameters
The following table provides our suggested parameters for the given security
levels.
n l k d r m q failure
Key Size
security
(bytes)
120 80 80 3 8 53 2 -23 795 128
138 92 92 3 10 67 2 -25 1156 192
156 104 104 3 12 71 2 -27 1385 256
Table 2 Suggested parameters for McNie PKE using 3-quasi-cyclic codes for 128, 192,
256-bit security levels
n l k d r m q failure
Key Size
security
(bytes)
92 46 69 3 10 59 2 -36 849 128
112 56 84 3 13 67 2 -38 1173 192
128 64 96 3 16 73 2 -36 1460 256
Table 3 Suggested parameters for McNie PKE using 4-quasi-cyclic codes for 128, 192,
256-bit security levels
In Table 3, we use an [n, l] public matrix G′ with the form given in (2)
and secret parity check matrix H , with the form given in (1), for an [n, k]
LRPC code of weight d. By decryption failure we mean the probability that
the LRPC decoding using H will fail, expressed as a power of 2. For example,
if we use a [72, 36] LRPC code for the private key, i.e. a 36× 72 LRPC matrix
H , the decryption can be carried out and will fail with a very small probability
of 1/223 ≈ 1.19× 10−7.
Security McNie DC-LRPC DC-MDPC QD-Goppa Goppa
Level 3-quasi 4-quasi [23] [34] [35] [7]
128 6360 6785 2809 9857 32768 1537536
192 9246 9380 - - 45056 4185415
256 11076 11680 - 32771 65536 7667855
Table 4 Comparison of key sizes for McNie PKE with other code-based cryptosystems
We compare the key sizes of our proposed cryptosystemwith knownMcEliece
based cryptosystems, for different security levels. The values appearing in Ta-
ble 4 are given in bits. The values appearing in the fourth column is the
McEliece cryptosystem using double-circulant LRPC codes by Gaborit, et al
16 Jon-Lark Kim et al.
in [20]. The fifth column uses double-circulant MDPC codes from [34]. The
last two columns use QD-Goppa codes [35] and Goppa codes [7], respectively.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced a new public key cryptosystem that combines McEliece
and Niederreiter cryptosystems. The proposed cryptosystem uses a parity
check matrix of an [n, k] in the private key and the generator matrix of an [n, l]
linear code in the public key is random in the sense that it can be freely chosen
independent of the private key. Hence, the system is resistant against struc-
tural attacks on McEliece public key cryptosystems. We have also suggested
several parameters for different security levels for McNie using 3-quasi-cyclic
and 4-quasi-cyclic LRPC codes. Although we were able to obtain relatively
small key sizes, this version of McNie suffers from the disadvantage of hav-
ing non-zero decoding failure probability. However, McNie still seems to be
a promising candidate for post-quantum cryptography. We have used LRPC
code in particular in this paper but any code can be used in the McNie cryp-
tosystem. For instance, Lau and Chan [30] proposed a version of McNie using
Gabidulin codes. They showed that Overbeck’s attack [38] and other struc-
tural attacks do not work for this version of McNie. Variants of McNie using
other families of codes and their cryptanalysis will be interesting research in
the future.
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